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INTRODUCTION
This paper explores  several themes in the relationship  between trade liberali-
zation  and  environmental  protection.  In recent years,  this relationship  has  become
both more controversial  and more important. We attempt to build on some ideas that
were examined at a workshop of the International  Agricultural  Trade Research Con-
sortium  in Toronto  in  1995  (Bredahl et al.,  eds.  1996)  and  at the  Third Agricultural
and  Food  Policy  Systems  Information  Workshop  in  Tucson  in  March  1997  (Loyns
et al., eds.  1997).  In order to set the context of what follows, we discuss the emerging
consensus on the environmental effects of agricultural trade liberalization under both
the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  (URA)  and  under the North American  Free  Trade
Agreement  (NAFTA) and we examine  the available evidence  on the  potential effects
of domestic environmental regulations on competitiveness and ultimately on trade in
agricultural  commodities.  We then turn  our attention  to some  conceptual  and prac-
tical issues that will need to  be resolved before  much more progress can be made  in
the  integration  of trade  and  environmental  policies.  The  general  focus  of our  dis-
cussion  is on  the  crop and  livestock  industries  of North American  agriculture,  but
many  of  the  issues  that  we  discuss  transcend  these  sectoral  or  geographic
boundaries.
The purpose of this paper  is two-fold. First, we will attempt to  lay to final rest
some enduring speculation  about the effects of trade liberalization  in agriculture  on
environmental  quality and about the impediments  to trade embodied  in national  or
subnational  environmental  policies.  Our assessment  of the growing  empirical  lite-
rature  on these questions  is that both effects  are small when measured  at a national
level, but that there  are important intranational  adjustments in production, transpor-
tation, trade and consumption that seem to have been underappreciated.  Our secondGrain-Livestock Harmonization
purpose  is to stretch the  conceptual  boundaries that we have  in mind when we talk
about  policy  harmonization.  Typically,  "policy"  has  meant  national  governmental
policy. But policy is made by subnational levels of government and it is also made by
voluntary trade associations,  by firms and by individuals.  Sometimes policy made in
these other contexts  contradicts initiatives  made at the national level and sometimes
it reinforces  those  decisions.  But what has not  been adequately  recognized,  in our
judgement,  is that policy  decisions at the  non-national  governmental  level can  be a
substitute  for  national  governmental  policy.  We  characterize  this  as  a  Coasian
perspective, but we  are mindful that in so doing,  our message  may be as misunder-
stood as was Coase's original paper.  The cumbersome process of policy integration at
the national governmental  level described by Josling (1997) provides the rationale for
policy action  at other  levels and  through other  means.  But it also creates  analytical
challenges to a discipline that has traditionally conceptualized  policy more narrowly
Trade  liberalization  and  environmental  protection  continue  to  enjoy  consi-
derable political and intellectual support in Canada and the United States. We do not
anticipate that this will fundamentally  change any time soon. But the constituencies
for the two agendas  have, traditionally, not overlapped greatly. With the inclusion of
agriculture  in  the  multilateral  trade  liberalization  process  under  the  General
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  and  now the  World Trade  Organization
(WTO), and the efforts of the negotiators of the  NAFTA to include agricultural  trade
in that regional  exercise in trade liberalization,  it has become increasingly important
to build some  bridges between  these largely disparate  constituencies.  These bridges
are  needed  to  forestall  political  gridlock  that  would  impede  progress  on  both
agendas.  We see this as both the rationale for and the terms of reference of the North
American Accord on Environmental  Cooperation  (NAAEC).
The  scope  of issues  covered  under environment also  requires  comment.  The
natural  environment  is composed  of physical  and  biological resources,  such  as air,
water,  soil,  plants and animals.  These  resources  serve  production and consumption
needs  and  also  are  valued  for  their  non-consumptive  uses.  They  may  be  held  as
private  or  several  property,  they  may  be  owned  as  common  property  or  as
government  property,  or  they  may  exist  in  a  state  of  open  access  where  the
ownership rights to  exclude others are not vested in any individual or organization.
In the discussion that follows, we are primarily concerned with the effects of changes
in the production,  distribution,  retailing and consumption of products  that originate
on farms  in response  to  reforms of agricultural  or environmental  policies.  We  limit
our discussion  to  environmental  effects  in  the  form  of changes  in  water quality or
quantity,  the  degradation  of  topsoil,  the  loss  or  gain  of  wildlife  habitat,  and  air
quality  changes.  Often  environmental  effects  are  defined  to  include  human  health
effects,  either  in the form  of operator or third party safety  issues or food safety con-
cerns.  Humans are part of the biosphere,  but consideration  of these types of human
risks and benefits related to trade liberalization  in agriculture  is beyond the scope  of
this paper.
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ENVIRONMENTAL  EFFECTS  OF TRADE  LIBERALIZATION
Trade treaties do not occur in  a market or policy vacuum.  Contemporaneous
changes in demand and supply,  or in domestic policies, driven by factors that can be
largely  independent of those that influence  the  outcome  of trade negotiations,  have
effects  on production and consumption that are confounded  with the effects of trade
policy changes.  In the case  of Mexico,  the  URA and the  NAFTA are the most recent
phases  of  a  process  of  policy  reform  that  began  in  the  mid-1980s  (OECD,  1997).
Mexico  joined  the  GATT  in  1986.  In  1987,  Mexico  unilaterally  exceeded  its  GATT
commitments  and reduced  its  maximum tariff rate to  20  percent.  Prior to Mexico's
entry  into the  GATT,  its agricultural  policy  emphasized  national  self-sufficiency  in
staple food grains,  food subsidies for low income urban consumers  and both output
price  supports  and  input  subsidies  for  domestic  producers.  Falling  government
revenues from oil in the latter half of the 1980s prompted a reform of those policies in
the  direction of more liberal markets and improved  efficiency of resource  use in the
agricultural  sector.  Both  the  URA  and  the  NAFTA  effects  on  Mexican  agriculture
need  to be seen, therefore,  in the context  of this longer process of policy and institu-
tional reform.
The  effects of trade treaties  on production,  consumption,  transportation  and
trade  go beyond  the direct  effects  of tariff reductions  and relaxations  of quotas  on
prices.  Recent  work by Runge  and  Fox  (1998)  on  the  effects of  the  NAFTA  on the
North American cattle and beef industry are a case in point, but the effect may also be
operating  in the  hog industry.  At one  level,  the  effect of the  NAFTA  on tariffs  and
quotas in cattle  and hogs between Canada and the United States was trivial1. But the
NAFTA also sent an important signal, not in the form of tariff reductions but rather as
a symbol  of a  "cease-fire",  in the  trade tensions in red meats that had been  acrimo-
nious for at least two decades.
Several  presentations  at  this workshop  address  the task  of quantifying  the
effects of the URA  and the  NAFTA on the agricultural  economy  of North America.
While these agreements were being negotiated, several studies attempted  to charac-
terize  the  potential  effects  of  different  hypothetical  levels  of  liberalization.  The
general  finding  of this  literature was  that,  at  least at  a national  industrial  level  of
aggregation,  the  effects  of  removing  all  tariffs,  export  subsidies  and  quantitative
restrictions  on trade in agricultural commodities would be small. This result rests on
the  generally  inelastic  demand  and  supply relationships  that  have  been  estimated
using historical data and econometric methods. The limited  empirical work that has
been conducted in the same vein since the actual  terms of the URA and the  NAFTA
have been available and continue  to indicate small effects on world agricultural pro-
duction and prices2.
1The  effect  of the  NAFTA  on  the  Mexican  cattle  and  beef industries,  through  decreased  tariffs and increased
market access, was more substantial  (Runge and Fox,  USITC, OECD).
2See Tanner (1997)  for a synopsis of modeling efforts on the URA.
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Environmental  Impacts
Our view is that agricultural trade liberalization affects prices of products and
inputs  through the  reduction  of tariffs,  the relaxation  of quantitative  restrictions  on
products or inputs,  and the harmonization  of technical  standards.  Compliance  with
the  terms of a trade agreement  may also  require  the modification  or even the elimi-
nation of programs and policies that influence  farm production decisions and actions
further  down  the supply chain.  The  primary  impact of these  changes occurs  when
producers  and consumers  respond  to new market opportunities.  It  is these changes
that,  for agriculture,  lead to the first round of environmental effects  of trade liberali-
zation.  These  effects  may  be  positive  or negative,  from  an environmental  point  of
view.  Second  round  effects come  as  these changes  in production and  consumption
translate  into  changes  in transportation  and  trade.  This  can  create  environmental
impacts if goods are transported  longer or shorter distances  or using different means
of transportation.  Of course, these effects could also be positive or negative.
A third round of environmental  impacts of trade liberalization  arises through
the effect of liberalization on economic growth. The relationship  between trade libe-
ralization  and  environmental  quality  is  complex.  This  relationship  has  been
examined  from  several  perspectives.  Some  environmental  critics  of  trade  liberali-
zation have argued that if economists are correct  in their claim that the dismantling of
protectionism raises the  average standard  of living of citizens  of the country whose
trade  policies  have  been  liberalized,  and  if higher  levels  of income  translate  into
greater  pressure  on  global  natural  resources,  then  trade  liberalization  should  be
rejected on environmental grounds.
The key empirical  relationship in this assessment is the one between economic
growth and environmental  quality. Aggregate  evidence  presented by Grossman  and
Krueger  (1995)  suggests  that  the  relationship  between  economic  development  and
environmental  degradation  is not  linear.  In  fact,  they suggest  that if a  correlation
exists, the relationship  may be an inverse  one, at least at higher levels of income  per
caput. Lucas (1996)  also concluded that, while the empirical relationships are far from
simple,  there  is not a monotonic increasing relationship  between standards  of living
and various measures of environmental  quality. Arrow et al.  (1995) also urge caution
in the interpretation  of the  available empirical evidence  on the  relationship between
economic growth and environmental  quality.
We are concerned with the relationship between trade and the environment at
a less aggregate level. In particular,  we are concerned with the effects of the URA and
of the  NAFTA  on environmental  quality through  the effects  of those  treaties on the
livestock and grain industries of North American agriculture. Trade liberalization can
affect  production  and  consumption  decisions  for  agricultural  commodities  in
numerous  ways.  These  decisions  can  result  in  mixed  effects  on  environmental
quality. A comprehensive  and balanced  approach is  required to ensure that all of the
important positive  and negative effects  of trade liberalization  are considered  in any
environmental  analysis  of  a trade  agreement.  Focus  on  one  class  of  effects  at  the
expense of the other has often lead to avoidable controversy.
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The primary focus of trade liberalization 3 negotiations  has been the reduction
of tariffs and, to  a lesser extent, quantitative restrictions  on imports and exports.  The
reduction  of tariffs has three primary effects.  First, consumers  face lower prices than
they otherwise would. As long as demand for the relevant product is not completely
inelastic,  we would expect consumption  to increase.  A second effect of tariff reduc-
tions  is  to  reduce  the  product  and  input  prices  received  by  domestic  producers.
Unless  supply  is  completely  inelastic,  we  would  expect  domestic  producers  to
produce  less after  a  reduction  in  tariffs  on  outputs  and  to  produce  more  after  a
reduction  in tariffs on inputs. The net effect of a simultaneous reduction  in tariffs on
inputs  and  outputs  is  therefore  ambiguous.  The  third  effect,  and  this  is  usually
ignored,  is  the  impact  on  government  revenues.  Unless  a  Laffer  Curve  effect  is
observed,  we would expect  a reduction  in tariffs to  decrease government  revenues.
Determining  the effects  of this fiscal impact on resource use in agriculture is clearly a
complex undertaking.  If revenues lost  from  tariffs are  replaced by income,  sales  or
other domestic taxes, then the effect on economic output depends on the incidence of
those  taxes relative to the tariffs they replace. Alternatively,  lost revenues could lead
to reduced government expenditures.
Environmental  Implications
The  environmental  implications  of these three  effects  are  complex.  A fall  in
product prices received by domestic producers can have two effects.  First, it can lead
to a contraction  of the extensive margin of production. Economically  marginal land
that was in production at the artificially high prices sustained by tariff protection will
become extramarginal. This extramarginal  land will tend to move to its next highest
valued use outside agriculture. If that use is forestry,  recreation or abandonment, this
can lead to an improvement in environmental  quality if those activities are more con-
ducive to the maintenance of wildlife habitat and water and air quality than the agri-
culture that they replace.  But this land use conversion may benefit some species that
are less well adapted  to the modified  ecosystem  under agriculture  and be a setback
for  those species  that did well  in that  agricultural  ecosystem.  So  even  at this basic
level, the environmental effects of trade liberalization  are equivocal.  And agricultural
land  use  may  maintain  physical  infrastructure  that slows  erosion  relative  to  what
would occur should agricultural land be abandoned. In these instances,  surface water
quality may be degraded by eroded sediment when that infrastructure,  in the form of
terraces and canals, falls into disrepair.
The  reduction  of  prices  received  by  domestic  producers  can  also  have  an
impact  on the intensive  margin  of production.  Falling  output prices,  often  accom-
panied by increasing input prices as input subsidies are also reduced  or abandoned
as part of a trade  agreement,  creates  an  incentive  for domestic  producers  to apply
fewer  inputs  per unit of land  than  they otherwise  would.  To  the  extent that these
inputs have been applied  in amounts that exceed  the absorptive capacity of the land
and the plants which are grown on it, they can be a contributing factor to degradation
3The discussion  that follows  is based  on the  conditions that typically prevail in developed country agricultures;
that domestic  policies favor domestic  producers and the expense of consumers and taxpayers.
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of  ground  and  surface  water  quality.  Under  these  circumstances,  reduced  input
intensity can shrink the environmental  footprint of agriculture. Of course,  reductions
in  tariffs  on inputs  would  act  generally  in the  opposite  direction  as  reductions  in
tariffs on outputs 4
It  is important  to remember, however, that the adjustments in resource  use in
agriculture that occur in response to a trade treaty are the joint products of the terms
of that treaty and domestic environmental  programs such  as land set-asides,  restric-
tions on land use and fertilizer applications  to protect groundwater or surface water,
local zoning regulations  that limit the expansion of livestock facilities, domestic  pes-
ticide regulations  and other resource  conservation  policies.  These  measures, at  least
initially,  could  constitute  constraints  on  changes  in  agricultural  production  in the
wake of a trade treaty. Moreover, the existence  of a such a treaty  can create pressures
for  policy change  in  these  areas.  For example,  non-targeted  soil  conservation  pay-
ments to  producers might attract only limited  international attention in the absence
of a trade treaty, but they become a potentially  contentious issue when the terms of
that treaty permit payments to farmers  only in the pursuit of a "legitimate"  environ-
mental measure  by "cost effective"  means.
Some  environmental  critics  of trade  liberalization  have  been  quick  to point
out,  however,  that  reduced  domestic  production  and  increased  domestic  con-
sumption  lead to  increased  international  trade  and  that trade  must be transported
from  exporting  countries  to importers. This  transportation  consumes  resources  and
releases  emissions into the  atmosphere and into  waterways. This increased  pressure
on air and water  should be acknowledged  as part of the consequences  of trade libe-
ralization  (Gabel,  1994).  There  are  important  qualifications  to this  effect,  however.
Intranational  transportation  is  not  always  less  environmentally  burdensome  than
international  transportation.  Canadian  trade  and transportation  policies  have  been
closely  linked  since  the  "National  Policy"  of  the  MacDonald  government  shortly
after  Confederation  in  1867. The  aim of this policy was to promote east-west  trans-
portation  and  interprovincial  trade  within the  fledgling  Canadian  confederation  of
provinces  at the  expense  of north-south trade  with the United  States.  To  the extent
that this policy was successful, it increased the distance  over which goods were trans-
ported within Canada and, for that matter, within North America. This example illus-
trates  the  possibility  that trade  liberalization  can  actually  lead to shorter  distances
traveled by commodities.
Trade  liberalization  generally  has  more  sweeping  implications  than  the
reduction  of  tariffs  and  the  relaxation  of  quantitative  restrictions  of  imports  and
exports.  Signatories  to a trade treaty may agree  to forgo  the use of certain classes  of
policies, for example export subsidies,  as well as to reduce tariffs and increase quotas.
Or  some  policies may  be abandoned  because  they become  prohibitively  expensive
under  more  liberal  trade.  The  NAFTA  and  the  URA  also  contained  provisions  to
4To complete  the taxonomy that we introduced  earlier,  relaxation  of import quotas  on  outputs or  inputs would
tend to reduce domestic  producer prices. Trade liberalization  in agriculture  usually also involves the application
of a set of criteria that rules certain types of input or output subsidies as "illegal"  under the terms of the treaty.
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harmonize  or  otherwise  render  compatible  national  technical  and  environmental
regulations.  Regulatory  harmonization  has proven  to be one of the most worrisome
concerns  to  environmental  critics  of  GATT  and  the  NAFTA.  It  was  arguably  the
potential for the so-called  "race to the  bottom" as the outcome  of regulatory compe-
tition  among Mexico,  Canada  and  the United States  that  lead to the signing  of the
NAAEC concurrently with the ratification of the NAFTA itself. Lindsey and Bohman,
at last year's meeting of this group, clearly laid out the trade economists' case against
a Procrustean homogenization  of technical standards and environmental  regulations
among trading  partners,  particularly  among trading  partners  at disparate  levels  of
economic development.  The  case,  however,  continues  to  be  a hard  sell outside  the
confines of the community of trade analysts and  negotiators. Later in this paper, we
outline reasons that might give economists pause in their criticism of harmonization.
The linkages between the terms of a trade treaty and the effects  of those terms
on patterns  of production  and  consumption  within  the  domestic  economies  of the
signatories to that treaty and on intra and international trade in commodities affected
by that treaty are complex. No less  complex are the  linkages between those changes
in production,  consumption, transportation  and trade and the various dimensions of
environmental quality. The quantitative  literature on the effects of the NAFTA  or the
URA on Agriculture specifically investigating  the likely effects  of the actual content
of those  agreements  is  not  voluminous.  Many  studies 5 were  conducted  while the
treaty negotiations were in progress.
Different possible levels of liberalization were modeled before it was yet clear
how much substantive  progress would be made on the liberalization  of agricultural
trade in either of those agreements.  The general  finding of this research effort is that
the aggregate effect  of even a radical,  almost  complete,  liberalization  of agricultural
trade  relations  would  be  modest.  Anderson  and  Strutt  (1996)  report  that  the
aggregate  effect  of such a hypothetical  liberalization  on  global  grain  and livestock
production  would be  negligible.  A  small6 relocation  of production  away from  the
most protectionist  high income  countries  to low income  countries,  for whom  trade
liberalization would amount to a cessation  of punitive trade treatment of their agri-
cultural economies,  and to some  of the  less protectionist developed  economies,  was
anticipated.  But  describing  the  regional  changes  in  production  in  terms  of  high
income  and  low  income  countries  masks  an  important  effect  of this  hypothetical
radical liberalization.  Various results reported by Tyers and Anderson  (1992)  indicate
that  agricultural  output  under  radical  liberalization  would  fall  by  as  little  as
10 percent  to as much  as  50 percent  in Japan  and in the  European Community. The
environmental  importance  of this adjustment follows  from the  fact that the agricul-
tural economies of these regions are currently among the most input intensive in the
world.  High producer  prices  have  encouraged  farmers  in these  countries  to apply
5See Anderson  and Strutt (1996) for an overview of this literature.
6Anderson and  Strutt indicate a 5 to 6 percent reduction  in production  in the industrialized  countries, primarily
Japan  and western Europe,  partially offset by increases  in North America  and Australia and  New Zealand,  and
an increase  in production in low income countries on the order of 3 to 8 percent.
281Grain-Livestock Harmonization
more plant nutrients, plant protection  products and animal units to each unit of land.
In our judgement, it is no coincidence that environmental concerns regarding agricul-
tural emissions are acute in these countries.
So, potentially at least,  agricultural trade liberalization could produce an envi-
ronmental  dividend.  Decreasing  input  intensive  agricultural  production  in  high
income  densely  populated  countries  that have  been  strongly  protectionist  toward
their agricultural industries and increasing more input extensive production in more
sparsely  populated  countries  could result  in a  less environmentally  invasive world
agriculture.  Of course,  an important qualification  of this generalization  is that the net
environmental effects of liberalization will also depend on the environmental policies
and institutions in place in  the countries where  production expands  that will shape
the specific resource  use adjustments that take place.
Evidence on  Mexico
The actual level of liberalization  achieved in agricultural trade relations in the
Uruguay Round  or  in  the  NAFTA was  far from  radical.  And the  less  liberalization
actually  achieved,  the  smaller  will  be  the environmental  dividend  gained.  Beghin
et al.  (1997) have recently published the results of a major study of the environmental
effects  of  the  NAFTA  in  Mexican  agriculture.  They  used7 a  general  equilibrium
approach  in  which Mexican  agriculture was  disaggregated  into  22 agricultural  and
14  related  processing  industries.  Thirteen  categories  of agricultural  emissions were
considered  in  the  model,  but  only  chemical  contamination  of  soils and  water  and
NO2 and SO2 were analyzed  in the three policy scenarios.  Results were obtained  for
the case of domestic environmental  policy reform  in Mexico, the  case of trade libera-
lization under the URA and the NAFTA alone, and finally the case of the coordinated
domestic environmental policy reform and trade liberalization. An important feature
of the model used in this study was its capacity to allow for adjustments in the input
mix employed in agriculture in response to changes in either trade or environmental
policies,  rather  than allowing  only changes  in  total output with fixed  input-output
combinations.  Emissions were modeled  as a function of inputs used, not output pro-
duced.  Environmental  policy  reform  was  modeled  as  the  application  of emission
taxes  on  outputs.  The  emission  taxes  modeled  in  this  study  were  hypothetical
because,  as  far  as  we  know,  no  such  taxes  are  used  in  Mexico,  Canada,  or  the
United States,  or in  other OECD countries for agriculture.  Taxes were levied  on pro-
ducers in proportion to the inputs used in production and to the emissions assumed
to be generated from the use of those inputs. In our view, the model's focus on inputs
is essential if modeling is to capture the intranational effects of policy change that are
often most important from an environmental point of view.
Studies such as Beghin  et al.  are useful as  preliminary indicators  of environ-
mental  effects,  but  a  growing  body  of  literature  indicates  that  local  variations  in
climate,  topography,  geology, hydrology and  ecology are critical factors  influencing
7This  analysis  employed the  OECD's Trade  and  Equilibrium Analysis  (TEQUILA)  general  equilibrium model  of
the Mexican economy.
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the  severity  of environmental  problems  associated  with  production  activities  and
also the effectiveness  of different measures that might be employed to address these
problems.  Antle,  et  al.  argue  that the  level  of aggregation  embodied  in most  CGE
models does not have enough resolution to identify these local effects.  Consequently,
these  models  give  us  little  insight  about  the  real  environmental  effects  that  will
ensue, just aggregate  loadings.  We  agree  and  suggest that these exercises  are  most
useful for judging general directions of change and orders of magnitude.8
Beghin  et  al.  report  that  the  imposition  of effluent  taxes  on  Mexican  agri-
culture would reduce aggregate  output of the  sector by a  little less than  5 percent.
Much of  this reduction  is  concentrated  in  the food  grains  sectors  that  have  tradi-
tionally  received  a  high  level  of protection  under Mexican agricultural  policy. The
trade liberalization scenario is modeled as a gradual elimination of tariffs by the year
2010  coupled with a  10  percent  increase  in world commodity  prices  over the same
time period,  presumably as a consequence  of liberalization  in the rest of the world.
Once  again, production  of the  major food  grains  crops, maize,  beans and  sorghum
declines under this scenario. Imports of these grains, as well as wheat and livestock,
increase.  Trade liberalization is accompanied by environmental  improvements as the
overall  level of agricultural  output declines,  but some  paradoxes  are observed.  For
example,  hog production falls under trade liberalization,  but NO2 emissions increase,
presumably  as a result of changes in rations brought about by increased availability
of imported feed grains.
To  our knowledge,  there  has  not been  any empirical  analysis of the  U.S.  or
Canadian  agricultural  economies  to parallel  the  Beghin  et  al.  study. Perhaps  this
group  should  coordinate  research  in  this area.  This  is  an ambitious  undertaking.
Many writers have  suggested that more effective  integration  of trade  and environ-
mental policies  will turn out  to be a central  issue in the next round  of multilateral
trade negotiations.  If they are correct,  then both the  analytical  capacity to study the
environmental  effects  of continued  trade liberalization  in agriculture  and improved
empirical analysis of the nature and size of those impacts will soon be needed.
Ultimately,  the  environmental  effects  of  adjustments  in  production,  distri-
bution, processing,  retailing  and  consumption  in response  to  a trade  treaty are site
specific.  Local  climate,  geology,  distribution  of  biota  and  hydrology  can  make
resource  adjustments  that  are  ecologically  benign  in  one  context  yet  harmful  in
another.  We would hasten to add that this observation in itself should not be used as
an  excuse  to delay efforts  at trade  liberalization  until  more complete  baseline  data
and analytical methods are available to enable us to identify site-specific  risk factors.
Since trade  liberalization  has  the effect  of reducing environmental  pressure  in some
places  and increasing it in others,  delaying the  process  of liberalization  merely pro-
longs  the  environmental  damage  inflicted  by agricultural  policies  that have  artifi-
cially encouraged  agricultural  production  as  the extensive  and  intensive  margins.
80n the other hand, the cost of the large number of highly disaggregated studies that would be needed to investi-
gate the local environmental  consequences of the NAFTA throughout the North American  agricultural economy
would be enormous.
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By the same token,  the uncertainty should  not delay putting environmental  policies
in  place  to  guard  against  reasonably  certain  cases  of  increased  environmental
pressure, such as along border zones.
EFFECTS  OF ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION
North American  farmers  fear  that environmental  programs hurt  their ability
to compete in global markets in two ways. First, if domestic environmental  programs
impose  strong standards  or restrict  the  use  of key  inputs in production,  their costs
will rise.  The  ultimate  effects  on trade  depend on the  size and  duration  of the cost
increase, and any changes  in the  ceteris paribus  conditions.  Second,  if foreign nations
guard  against  perceived  environmental  risks  from  imports  by  requiring  certain
product or  product-related  process  characteristics,  market  access  will be  restricted.
An example is a restriction on grain shipments for phytosanitary reasons.  The signifi-
cance of such restrictions  depends upon their scope and the firmness of enforcement.
Concern about  the trade effects  of environmental  programs  is relatively new
to  agriculture,  but not  to other  industries  (Pearson,  1993).  National  air, water  and
land quality programs approved in the  1970s required firms outside production agri-
culture to reduce pollution, mostly by adopting specified  technologies.  Government
and business leaders voiced fear about maintaining trade competitiveness  in the face
of  added  compliance  costs.  They  felt  that  countries  with  lower  environmental
standards  would capture  a  greater  share  of trade  markets,  and  even  attract  some
domestic  firms.  By  and  large,  their  fears  have  not  materialized.  We  explain  the
reasons below, and can learn from them to inform the emergent debate in agriculture.
The  issue  of whether  environmental  programs  affect  trade  competitiveness
should  be  posed  as  "How  can  a  country  maximize  welfare  from  its  choices  of
domestic  production  and  consumption,  of  trade,  and  of  environmental  mana-
gement?"  Perhaps Kym Anderson  (1996,  p.  44,  emphasis  added)  has  answered  this
question most clearly  "...  the fundamental point remains that free trade is nationally
and globally superior  to no trade so  long  as the optimal  pollution tax is in place."
There are many caveats to this conclusion,  but the principle is clear. Both open trade
and  optimal environmental  management  are  requisite  to maximizing  national  and
global economic  welfare.  If the conclusion that liberalized  trade improves welfare  is
to  hold,  environmental  shadow  prices  must  be  included  in  the  decision  calculus
throughout liberalization  (Ervin,  1997).  Hence, programs that internalize the external
environmental costs and benefits of farming and ranching are needed.
What  constitutes  an  "optimal"  pollution  control  program  requires  further
comment. In theory, we know that such a program will push pollution control to the
point where  the  present value  of the  stream  of benefits from avoided  damages just
equals the  present value  of the  stream of marginal  benefits from avoided  damages.
However, measuring  the benefits of environmental  improvement is often difficult  or
impossible  because  of  missing  current  market  prices,  let  alone  forecasting  future
values.  This  relegates  the optimal  decision rule to the  classroom  for many  environ-
mental management  problems.  In  its place,  the  choice  of an  "optimal"  approach  is
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left to the judgement  of duly elected  politicians  or  responsible  public  officials  who
may consider  available  economic  and  other  evidence.  In  practice,  this  often  boils
down to establishing physical or biological standards,  such as the maximum permis-
sible  concentration  of water  pollution  in  a  stream  based  on  known  or  suspected
health  risks,  and  then  finding  the  most  cost-effective  approach  to  achieve  those
standards.  Is  this  in any  sense  "optimal"?  Perhaps,  if we  can  be  assured  that  the
decision-makers  weigh  all  available  evidence  and  accurately represent  the public's
preferences.  These  difficulties  may  explain  why  Anderson  (1996)  opts  for  the
requirement of "something approaching an optimal tax" rather than strict optimality.
It may also  explain why  the  URA  did not  impose stronger  conditions  on the  legi-
timacy of agri-environmental  programs  explained below.
Studies of other industries have found remarkably little evidence of trade and
industrial location  effects due to environmental  regulations.  The main approach  has
been to analyze the relationships between  trade flows and pollution abatement costs
(PAC).  PAC  comprise  a  small  share  of  an  industry's  costs  (on  average  less  than
2.0 percent),  but vary considerably over sectors  (OECD, 1993).  Moreover,  differences
in PAC between countries have declined over time. Comprehensive reviews conclude
that compliance  costs have  caused  insignificant  output reductions  on average,  and
show little if any evidence  of any significant trade impacts  (Dean,  1992).  The lack of
significant  effects  may  reflect  a  host  of offsetting  influences,  e.g.,  similar  environ-
mental programs across competing exporters, exchange rate forces, and management
and technology innovations.
If production costs rise sufficiently from environmental regulation,  some firms
may migrate  to countries with lower  standards.  This  is the well  known  "pollution
haven"  hypothesis  that  "dirty"  firms will move abroad  to avoid heavy compliance
costs.  Their  movement  may  reflect  an  intentional  economic  change  because  the
industry creates  large environmental  damages.  Theoretically,  if the countries  charge
for significant environmental  costs and compensate for significant benefits left out of
market prices, then such a move  can leave both countries better off.  But concluding
that the shifts improve global  economic welfare  depends on whether sufficient poli-
cies have been implemented  at home and abroad. Studies have found scant evidence
that  PAC  have  affected  industrial  location  decisions  (Leonard,  1988;  Dean,  1992).
Firms  base their location  decisions on  a variety of factors,  including  labor produc-
tivity, infrastructure,  transportation  costs,  and  other  factors.  If abatement  costs  are
relatively small, then the incentive to reduce these costs by relocating is small as well.
Two  important  qualifications  apply  to  the conclusion  of insignificant  trade
and relocation  effects by environmental  regulation. First, some industries spend very
different  amounts  on  pollution  control  and  face  considerably  different  degrees  of
competition. Analyses of aggregate trade flows may miss specific effects  on high PAC
sectors that become  apparent in more detailed studies.  High-cost sectors may suffer
from unfavorable  pairwise  differences with  their competing  exporters.  Even  small
amounts may be important in  increasingly competitive  international  markets under
trade  liberalization.  Second,  the  studies  are  backward  looking  by  necessity,  and
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subsectors  that anticipate strengthened  environmental  requirements  require  careful
monitoring.  Given  the extensive  use of land and water by agriculture  and a trend to
more direct controls,  close scrutiny appears warranted.
Most developed countries pursue a similar set of environmental  objectives for
agriculture,  including reduced  water  pollution,  soil erosion  control, wildlife habitat
protection,  and  landscape  preservation,  albeit  with  differing  priorities  and
approaches  (OTA,  1995).  The  United States  predominantly  uses voluntary-payment
schemes 9 The  programs  often  combine  education  to  identify  problems,  technical
assistance to  install recommended  practices,  and cost-sharing  to defray a portion of
the  expense  of implementing  a  practice.  Another  approach  is  to make  rental pay-
ments  to  retire  cropland  from  production  temporarily.  No  other  U.S.  industry  is
offered  the  wide  array  of voluntary-payment  programs  for  environmental  mana-
gement that are offered to agriculture.
With  the exception of the short-lived  Lower Inventories For Tomorrow  (LIFT)
program in the  1970s, Canada has not used land set-asides  as a central instrument of
agricultural  resource  policy.  In  part,  the  export  orientation  of  the  Canadian  grain
industry  makes  this  policy  approach  unattractive.  There  is  no  comprehensive
national  environmental  agricultural  policy  process  in  Canada.  The  federal  Farm
Income  Protection  Act of  1991  represented  a  limited step  in this direction.  The  Act
required an environmental  analysis 1 0 of all new federal agricultural policies and pro-
grams  and  a periodic  environmental  review  of existing  programs.  Analyses  were
conducted for the Gross Revenue Insurance Program  (GRIP)  and for the Net Income
Stabilization Accounts  (NISA)  (Environmental Management Associates,  1993)  as well
as  for  the  national  crop insurance  program  (Von Massow  and  Fox)  but we  are not
aware  of any  more  recent  studies.  Other  Canadian  agriculturally  related  environ-
mental programs  have taken  the form  of cost sharing non-targeted voluntary  initia-
tives.  A  case  in  point  is  the  Soil and  Water  Environmental  Enhancement  Program
(SWEEP).  This  program  consisted  of research,  demonstration  projects,  information
distribution  and  producer  assistance  directed  at  reducing  the  rate of sediment  and
phosphorous  deposition  from  agricultural  sources  into  the  Great  Lakes,  primarily
Lake  Erie.  Mexico  possesses  the  authority  to  pursue  direct  controls  in  agro-
environmental  management  under the  1988  General Ecology  Law.  While this  broad
authority exists, it is unclear to what extent the provisions have been implemented.
9Payments for  environmental management  were  sanctioned  in the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement on Agriculture
under two  conditions:  (1) they  are applied as  part of a clearly  defined government  program  to fulfill  specific
conditions,  and (2) the payment amount cannot exceed the cost of the management practice of the loss in income
associated with program  compliance  (Annex 2).  Known as the "Green  Box" conditions,  they are part but not all
of the requirements  to ensure that subsidies  do not cause trade distortions.  In addition, the subsidies should be
provided only  in  cases where  the expected  benefits  of environmental  improvement outweigh  the  anticipated
costs.  Also, the subsidies should be structured to stimulate  producer and R&D innovations that minimize long-
term  compliance  costs.  If  the subsidy  does  not satisfy  these conditions,  it  can  attract  capital  to the  industry,
enlarge  supplies,  and may aggravate environmental  problems. Agro-environmental  subsidies in the  U.S. gene-
rally have not met the minimum compensation and incentive-compatibility  requirements (OTA).
0 The  Act did not require  an environmental  assessment,  which  is a formal quasi-judicial  process  in  Canada.  The
environmental  analysis indicated  in the Act is ad hoc.
286Ervin and Fox  287
The  dominance  of voluntary programs implies  that North American  farmers
generally  hold de jure or de facto rights  to dispose of wastes into streams and other
environmental  media  (Bromley,  1997).  The  extensive  use  of payments  reflects  that
farmers  require  compensation  for  any  diminution  of  those  rights.  Defining  cost
responsibility in favor of producers likely stems from the special political status given
agriculture  in developed  nations. It also affects the  technical difficulty an economic
cost of implementing regulations  to control diffuse sources of pollution that can  not
be readily traced  to their sources  over such  a large land  base and from  millions  of
diverse production units, i.e., nonpoint pollution.
Some  compulsory  environmental  programs  apply  to North  American  agri-
culture.  Not  strictly  regulation,  the  United  States  has  compliance  schemes  that
require farmers  participating  in other agricultural  programs to meet minimum  con-
servation standards  or risk losing the program payments.  Each country regulates the
introduction and use  of pesticides.  Generally, human  and environmental  risks from
pesticides are controlled by registering  only those compounds deemed to be without
excessive risk  from application  or through  food,  water  or air exposure.  Some  pro-
grams also regulate  the alteration of lands that would cause environmental  loss.  For
example,  conversion or drainage of certain wetlands and endangered species habitat
in the United States is regulated. Finally, large confined animal facilities  generally are
subject  to  permits  issued  by  federal,  state  and  local  governments  that  specify
required waste control technologies and/or maximum effluent.
How has  this mix  of programs  affected  trade  competitiveness?  The  general
hypothesis  is  clear-the trade  effects should  be negligible,  given the dominance  of
voluntary-payment  programs.  The  U.S.  government  spends  about  $3.5  billion  per
year on such programs,  most of which  goes for  land rental payments,  cost-sharing,
and education/technical  assistance  (USDA-ERS). These programs do not exert com-
petitiveness  drag on  individual  farms  and  ranches.  The  effect  on  industry  supply
may indeed be significant  as discussed below for set aside. The  effects of the regu-
latory  programs  also  appear  modest.  Assessments  have  shown  that U.S.  pesticide
regulation  has not caused  significant economic loss  for the  farm sector  (Osteen and
Szmedra,  1989).  Deen and Fox as well  as Deen and McEwen have argued that while
Canadian  farmers  often  lament  perceived  disadvantages  in  access  to pest  control
inputs relative to their U.S. counterparts,  the actual effects on competitiveness  are not
large.t Comprehensive  estimates of the  effects of US regulations  on confined  animal
facilities,  wetlands alteration,  and endangered  species protection on competitiveness
have  not been  made.  However,  a survey of assessments of those programs  through
the  early  1990s  suggested that the  wetlands and endangered  species  programs had
not  affected  broad  segments  of  U.S.  farms  and  ranches,  and  the  confined  animal
facility  regulations  were  unevenly  and  weakly  enforced  by  states  (OTA,  1995,
pp. 97-98).
tEditor's  note:  Several  surveys  have shown  that Canadian  farm  chemical  prices are  no  higher (or  lower)  than
those in the U.S.,  exchange rate effects included.
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Formal  tests  of  the  competitiveness  hypothesis  are  fraught  with  difficulty.
Data on pollution control  costs are not collected  and reported  for agriculture, unlike
other industries. Statistical analysis also has proven difficult because of missing data
on the net costs  of the programs.  Looking at payments as well as costs  is important
because  past  programs  have  made  substantial  transfers  into  agriculture  in  many
countries  (Paden,  1994).  Those  subsidies  may have  boosted  production  and trade,
especially when coupled with production and export subsidies.
Tobey  (1991)  estimated  the  potential for  different crops to  generate  pollution
and correlated the estimates with the revealed comparative  advantage of crops in the
world market. He found that the crops that perform well in world markets also have
the largest pollution potential.  Therefore, stringent programs to control that pollution
could  affect  their  trade  advantage.  He  concluded,  however,  that  trade  competi-
tiveness  losses  are  likely  to  be  modest  for  three  reasons.  First,  most  competing
exporters  have  introduced  similar  agro-environmental  programs.  Second,  deve-
loping  countries do not  hold large  market shares  in most of the commodities,  such
that uneven environmental  requirements  will  greatly affect  trade. Finally,  any com-
petitiveness  effects will likely be swamped by larger forces such  as exchange rates.
Some trends  raise the  concern that production and trade may be increasingly
affected. There is a distinct chance that conservation  subsidies may rise in the form of
green payments  as production  and export  subsidies are diminished.  Environmental
subsidies do  not necessarily distort trade  as explained  above. However,  in practice,
subsidy programs  often depart from the optimal conditions. Also, there appears to be
a trend toward  environmental  policies  with more cost responsibility  for farms  and
ranches.  In the  United States,  30  states have passed laws  that authorize  enforceable
measures  for farm water pollution, most during the last decade  (Ribaudo,  1997).  The
trend is for more direct controls.
The  potential for greater effects  exists because  of the industry's  extensive  use
of land and  water.  Two programs  illustrate that potential.  The first is land set-aside
for  environmental  purposes.  A  1995  study  estimated  significant  trade  gains  from
downsizing the  U.S.  Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP),  and  few environmental
losses  (Abel, Daft,  and Earley). Retirement  of up to  14.75 million hectares in the CRP
was reauthorized by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform  (FAIR) Act of
1996. Current enrollment stands at about  12 million hectares. It is unclear at this point
how much more land will be retired. The USDA implemented  an improved environ-
mental benefits index and rules against paying rents in excess of market rates to help
avoid  retirements without  net  benefits.  These  reforms bring  the  CRP  more  in  line
with  the  URA requirements  for  environmental  payments.  Absent  the support  pro-
grams  that  previously  boosted  production,  set  aside  now  is  more  likely  to  be  a
binding constraint on production.  However,  it is possible that some enrollments  are
simply  retiring  cropland  at the  extensive  margin that was  brought into  production
under previous programs.t
tEditor's note: See the discussion of CRP in the Young and Adams paper in this publication.
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The second is controls on pesticides.  Major reform of U.S. pesticide programs
was approved in the 1996 Food Quality Protection  Act (FQPA) which will involve the
re-registration  of most compounds.  The potential exists that many current pesticides
will lose their registration.  Concern by U.S. farmers emerges about maintaining trade
competitiveness  under the tighter controls. American agriculture is heavily reliant on
these  inputs. For  example  in  1995,  324  million  pounds of active ingredients  (a.i.)  of
herbicides,  70 million  pounds  (a.i.)  of insecticides,  45 million  pounds  (a.i.)  of fungi-
cides,  and  127  million pounds  (a.i.)  of other pesticides  were estimated  to be applied
on  cropland growing major  U.S.  crops  (USDA,  ERS,  1997).  The total  of 566 million
pounds  of a.i.  compares to  215  million  pounds in  1964.  Herbicide  use on corn grew
from 26 million pounds (a.i.)  in  1964 to 210 million pounds  (a.i.)  in 1991,  and on soy-
beans from 4 to  70 million  pounds  (a.i.). Although acute  toxicity risk has  risen over
the period, analysis shows that a chronic toxicity index has declined due to less per-
sistence in the environment of newer compounds  (USDA-ERS).
Two  tentative  findings  emerge  about the  effects  of agro-environmental  pro-
grams on trade. First, current programs mostly cause negligible  effects. U.S. set-aside
programs are  the  major exception.  Their  effects  on  grain  production and  trade  are
likely  significant.  Their  potential  to  cause  welfare  losses  or  gains  depends  on  the
rules  used  to  enroll  the  lands.  Second,  future  agro-environmental  programs  will
enlarge the  potential  for trade effects.  Restrictions  on pesticide use  and tighter  con-
trols on  wastes from  large  confined  animal  facilities  are notable.  Any trade  distor-
tions from these restrictions  depend on the specific programs adopted.
ENVIRONMENTAL  TRADE  MEASURES  (ETMS)
Article XX of the  GATT provides for two general exceptions  from a country's
GATT  obligations  that  permit  a  country  to  institute  measures  related  to environ-
mental management:
Article  XX(b)  provides  an  exception  for  measures  "necessary  to  protect
human, animal or plant life or health"; and
Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures  "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible  natural  resources  if such measures  are  made  effective in  conjunction
with restrictions  on domestic production or consumption."
An  application  of either exception  generally comes  in the form of a product
standard,  such  as  the  amount  of  pesticide  residue  or  the  presence  of unwanted
insects  on  imported  foods.  Countries  also  use  product-related  process  standards,
such as the satisfaction of processing sanitary conditions.
Technically, the regulation is on the product, but it relates to the process of pro-
duction.  Controversy surrounds the use of process standards for environmental  pur-
poses.  The  exceptions  legitimize country  actions  to protect  their  natural  resources
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from trade-related  risks. Nonetheless,  fears  of a proliferation  of environmental  non-
tariff  trade  barriers  abound  (Runge).  Article  XX  actions  must avoid  unnecessary
trade interference,  such as unequal treatment of imports and domestic production.
Esty  (1994)  believes that the exceptions  provide an insufficient  basis for envi-
ronmental  management.  His  main  reasons  are  the  restrictions  on  "process"
approaches  since  environmental  effects  largely  derive from  the  production  process
rather  than  products,  and  the  proscription  on unilateral  actions  when  multilateral
environmental  organizations are absent. Despite these concerns, tens of thousands  of
country  actions  to  protect  plant  and  animal  health  have  been  implemented  and
several international  environmental  agreements  operate,  with few  GATT  challenges
to date. The apparent incongruity may be one of "the glass is half-empty, or the glass
is half-full". Whether the existing mechanisms  are sufficient to address modern envi-
ronmental transboundary  issues is the point of contention.
The  URA  added  two  new  agreements  related  to  environmental  mana-
gement-Sanitary  and Phytosanitary  (SPS)  Measures  and the  Technical  Barriers  to
Trade  (TBT).  SPS issues currently have the larger potential to affect agricultural trade.
The  SPS  agreement  sets  out  conditions  under  which  sanitary  and  phytosanitary
measures  can  be  used to  protect  human,  animal or  plant health.  Specific  examples
include inspection, certification  and approval procedures, quarantine treatments, and
the establishment of pesticide tolerances.  The apparent driving forces for passing the
new  SPS  agreement  were  food  safety  concerns  and  avoidance  of  unscientific
measures  that restrict  food  exports.  Nonetheless,  the  SPS  measures  include  animal
and plant life and health, and therefore pertain to the natural environment.
How  might  the  SPS Agreement  affect  the grain-livestock  sector?  One  of the
largest environmental  risks of liberalized agricultural trade is opening new pathways
for  the  importation  of harmful  non-indigenous  species  (HNIS).  Over  half  of  the
weeds  and  40 percent  of the  insect  pests  affecting  U.S. agriculture  and  forestry are
estimated  to  be  non-indigenous.  Prominent  examples  include  the  Russian  wheat
aphid,  and  50  to  75  percent  of major  U.S.  weeds  that  cause  extensive  damage  to
public  and private lands. Jenkins notes that approximately  80 percent of the harmful
new  exotics  detected  from  1980  to  1993  in  the  United  States  were  unintentional
imports through  trade. The costs of HNIS in the United States  have been significant
(OTA,  1993).  Cumulative  economic  damage  from  1906  to  1991  caused  by  79  NIS
organisms  or  species  cases,  less  than  14  percent  of  the  total,  was  estimated  at
$97 billion  (1991$).  Losses due to exotic agricultural weeds could not be included.
The  SPS  code pertains to  HNIS  cases.  The code sanctions  the  use of quaran-
tines, for example, to minimize harmful introductions.  The United States has invoked
this  provision  on a  number  of occasions:  for  example,  to  ban  seed  potatoes  from
Canada.  Such actions may be viewed as disguised barriers to trade, and open to chal-
lenge  under  GATT  rules.  The  GATT  has  rarely  been  used  for  such  challenges,  as
noted  above.  Article  XX  establishes  a nation's  right to  establish  its  own rules  and
regulations regarding human, animal, and plant health  (which cover NIS).
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Despite  abundant  fears,  there  is  little  evidence  to document  environmental
technical  barriers.  One  survey  analyzed  the impact  of environmental  standards  on
the  exports  of southern  U.S.  commodities  (Marchant  and  Ballenger,  1994).  Their
findings did not reveal extensive  trade effects  from current domestic or foreign envi-
ronmental actions,  with the exception of the scheduled phase out of methyl bromide.
Comprehensive  assessment  of  technical  barriers  to  U.S.  agricultural  exports  is
underway  (Roberts  and  DeRemer,  1997).  Technical  barriers  in  this  analysis
encompass all product or product-related process standards that impede U.S. exports
regardless of their legality vis-a-vis GATT rules. Therefore,  they could include trans-
parent violations of existing SPS and TBT codes, legitimate  applications of the codes
(e.g.,  to  protect  open  access  resources),  or  applications  of  product  and  process
standards that have questionable  legitimacy.  The authors report an extensive survey
of USDA field staff and representatives  of producer groups who identified approxi-
mately  300  "questionable"  measures  in  63  foreign  markets,  and  estimated  that the
technical  barriers  threatened,  constrained,  or blocked  nearly  $5 billion in  1996  U.S.
exports.
The "questionable"  barriers were unevenly distributed by value of impact, by
region,  and  by  purpose.  The  estimated  trade  impact  (loss  in producer  gross sales
revenue)  was under  $10 million for 70 percent of the barriers.  On the other hand, just
20  barriers  accounted  for  over  60  percent  of the  total  impact.  East  Asian  and  the
Americas countries  led other regions in barriers.  About 60 percent of the impact was
attributable  to  measures  that  affected  market  expansion,  followed  by  market
retention,  and then market access. Over 90 percent of the issues are SPS applications,
and  the  remainder are  other technical  barriers.  The  barriers  generally mirrored the
broad pattern of trade flows for U.S. agricultural products.  Although the survey was
only the first step in a larger assessment,  it suggests that technical barriers materially
affect  U.S. agricultural trade. The vast majority of barriers pertain  to private natural
resources,  e.g.,  orchards,  and not to open access  environmental resources.
INCORPORATING  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROVISIONS  IN TRADE AGREEMENTS:
LESSONS FROM  RECENT  EXPERIENCE
There is increasing international interest in the integration of agricultural trade
and related environmental protection measures11. Calls for integration by trade nego-
tiators and trade policy analysts tend to be animated  by concerns that environmental
policies might become the next generation of protectionism  (Runge).  Both the GATT
and  the  NAFTA have  come  under  fire  from environmental  policy  analysts  for not
having  achieved  an  appropriate  level  of  integration  of  environmental  and  trade
policy  concerns.  Calls  for integration  from environmentalists  have  primarily  been
concerned with trade based  on a false comparative  advantage when production of a
traded  commodity  degrades  some  environmental  value  and  this  cost  is  not  ade-
quately reflected  in the price of the traded good 1 2 (Paden,  1994). As  a result of these
11Recent work by the OECD  (1993)  and the agenda  of this workshop  are evidence of the growing  interest in this
topic.
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competing perspectives  and motivations,  it is not always  clear what purpose advo-
cates of policy  integration  have in  mind. The  process  of integration  of trade  policy
and  environmental  policy  is just beginning.  There  are  reasons  to  believe  that  the
NAFTA represents an improvement over the GATT in this respect, however trilateral
support  for  the  Commission  for  Environmental  Cooperation  has  not  been  strong,
indicating that the practical commitment to integration may not be as strong as some
would  like  it to  be.  It  remains  an  open  question  whether  policy  integration  at  the
international  level is best achieved  within a multilateral trade organization,  like the
WTO,  or  with  a  parallel  independent  multilateral  environmental  organization,  a
WEO.
Our view is that trade treaties should ensure  that trade is taking place under
conditions  in which the  appropriate  costs of external effects  of production and con-
sumption are internalized  (taken into account) by producers, and consumers  so that
trade  is not being  distorted. by environmental  subsidies  and that national  measures
taken  to achieve  such internalization  are not disguised ways of protecting domestic
producers  from foreign  competition.  This  purpose  is clearly  easier  to state concep-
tually than operationally. What do we mean by internalization of appropriate  costs?
The  economists concept  of externality has  been stretched  to the point that it cannot
help  us  draw the relevant  boundaries.  It has  come to mean  any instance  of human
action that generates harmful or beneficial effects for someone who is not party to the
action or market exchange that originated  those effects. Not all such harmful interde-
pendence needs  to be internalized  before trade could be considered free of environ-
mental subsidies13
Does the requirement that trade not be implicitly supported  by environmental
subsidy require  that  "free  trade"  satisfy  the requirements  of sustainability  (as sug-
gested by Paden and  by Common  and Perrings)  that  is, are intergenerational  envi-
ronmental  subsidies out of bounds  as well as the  more commonly considered  third
party costs associated  with air and water pollution?  Is it necessary  to internalize  all
third  party  costs,  or  only  those  that  are  worth  doing,  in  the  sense  articulated  by
Demsetz and Dahlman?
Regardless  of  how  these  conceptual  issues  are  resolved,  several  practical
resource related issues, in our judgement, are emerging in the trade and environment
area that have important implications for the grains and livestock industries of North
American agriculture. These include the following.
l2This  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  an  environmental  subsidy,  implying  that  some  natural  or  environmental
resource  is  being employed  in  the  production  of a  traded commodity,  but that  the  opportunity  cost of  that
resource  is not accurately  reflected  in the price  at  which that good  is traded.  Trade  analysts,  however,  use the
term  "environmental subsidy"  as we used it earlier,  to refer to a payment by government to farmers  in exchange
for farmers  providing some type of environmental service,  for example, maintaining endangered  species habitat
on  their  land. These  are  clearly  different  ideas.  This  difference  is  but another  illustration  of the  difficulties
involved in building bridges of communication  between the constituencies of trade and environmental policies.
In the sense that this term is used by Paden (1996).
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Full Cost Pricing of Irrigation Water.  Irrigation  water  is  becoming  an increasingly
scarce resource  in Mexico,  as well as the western United States and Canada. Farmers
have rarely paid the full cost of providing this water. Increasingly, however, the envi-
ronmental costs of reservoir and canal or pipeline construction and the alternative  in
situ  and  consumptive  uses,  especially  urban  consumptive  uses,  are  being  raised.
Determining the  level of subsidization of irrigation water costs for farmers is contro-
versial and the stakes are high.
Full Cost Pricing of Grazing on Government Owned Lands. Few  issues  in  agricul-
tural policy in  the United States,  and to  a growing extent in western  Canada,  are as
explosive  as grazing fees on federal lands. There are shreds of evidence that grazing
fees in the United States  and  Canada are less  than those that would prevail  if those
lands were privately owned and the fees were negotiated  as market exchange prices.
But the  size of the  difference between  fees that would prevail  under those  circum-
stances and current fees is difficult to determine.  And the potential countervail  issue
is the difference between the differences.
Full Cost Pricing of Transportation Services.  Grain  transportation  off  the  Prairie
provinces  in Canada  as well as through  the combination of rail,  truck and  barge in
the midwestern United States, historically has been fraught with implicit and explicit
transportation  subsidies. These  subsidies have played a pivotal role in the  evolution
of the development of the continental grain transportation infrastructure. This in turn
has influenced the location of production and processing activities. The current envi-
ronmental footprint of the grain  industries, and indirectly through feedgrains of the
livestock  feeding  and  finishing  industries,  reflects  this  history  of subsidization.  In
Canada,  the  demise  of  the  Crow  Rates  and  their  descendants  is  already  being
acknowledged  as  an  important  factor  in the  regional  transformation  of  livestock
feeding and meat processing at a national level. In the United States, water transport
of grains  raises  the  issue  of watershed  management,  water  use,  and  the  full cost
pricing of water used in transportation as well as irrigation.
Compensation of Landowners for Regulatory Takings Regarding the Protection of
Endangered and Threatened Species.  Policies to protect endangered species, wetlands
and  other natural  areas  differ  substantially  between  Canada  and the United  States
(Ivy, 1996) and  even more so between  Mexico  and its NAFTA partners.  The issue  of
compensation of land owners for restrictions  on land use to preserve wetlands  or to
protect threatened and endangered  species  is being raised with increasing frequency
in the  United States  and  Canada  (Fox,  1998).  To  the extent  that emerging  compen-
sation  practices  differ  between  the two countries,  they could  be  seen as  an unfair
competitive advantage.
Reform of U.S. Conservation Reserve  Programs. The  available  evidence  indicates
that expenditures  under various conservation  provisions of U.S. farm bill legislation
has  been,  to put it  mildly, not closely  correlated  with the  achievement  of environ-
mental objectives. It is not easy to define the criteria for targeted environmental  pro-
grams. But Fox et al.  (1995) have argued that there needs to be a clear contribution  of
erosion to off-site water quality problems  before government action is justified. If we
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accept  this  argument,  then there  is  room  for considerable  improvement  in  U.S.  soil
conservation  policy  The  current  level  and  distribution  of  expenditures  would  be
hard  to justify  as  a  cost  effective  means  of  attaining  a  legitimate  environmental
objective,  making  them  potentially  vulnerable  under  URA  provisions  (see
footnote 9).
Cross Border Water Pollution Problems,  especially on the Mexico/U.S.  border. As
part of the environmental side-agreement  of the NAFTA, the North American Accord
for Environmental  Cooperation,  Mexico and the U.S.  agreed to establish a special  ini-
tiative to reduce water pollution crossing their borders. Early progress on these issues
however, has been disappointing.
Domestic  Water Quality Problems from Agricultural Emissions. In  the  developed
economies,  agriculture  is one  of the last sectors to  have come  under legislative and
regulatory  scrutiny  for air and water  borne  emissions.  The exclusion  of agriculture
from  the  process  of regulatory  oversight  is  usually attributed  to agricultural  emis-
sions  being characterized  as  "non-point"  sources.  But  this term fails to adequately
convey the nature  of the problem of mitigating agricultural emissions.  All emissions
come from somewhere,  from some  "point". The problem with agricultural emissions
can  best be explained  in terms of the costs of information.  National or even regional
regulatory agencies  face  a daunting  task in obtaining information  about the  location
of agricultural emission sources. These sources are numerous and are spread out over
large  areas. And emissions  from most agricultural sources  are  seasonal  or episodic.
There  is  not  a  continuous  regular  flow  of  displaced  sediment  from  crop  land  to
adjacent water bodies.  Sediment transport  occurs contingent on weather  events and
the  extent  to  which  topsoil  is  exposed  during  these  events.  Similarly,  livestock
manure  ends  up in  streams  when  storage  facilities  overflow,  when  grazing  cattle
obtain  access  to stream  banks  or  when  manure  is  misapplied.  These  are  not  con-
tinuous  repetitive  processes  like  many industrial  or  municipal  emission  processes.
Consequently,  it is often more costly to identify the points at which agricultural emis-
sions originate.  And this makes it more costly to trace the transport and fate of those
emissions.
Perhaps,  in  light of the  relative  risks  associated  with agricultural  emissions
and the cost of obtaining better  information about their origins, transport and fate, it
has made  sense to  leave agricultural  emissions  until near the  end of the  regulatory
process.  In  any  case,  baseline  data  for  agricultural  emissions  in  Canada  and  the
United  States  have  not  been  readily  available.  But  this  is  changing  rapidly  For
example,  the  Economic  Research  Service's  (1997)  Agricultural  Resources  and  Envi-
ronmental  Indicators  provides  a  comprehensive  empirical  overview  of  the  rela-
tionship  between  primarily  crop  production  and  environmental  quality  in  the
United States.  While the  available data on sources  of agricultural emissions  and our
understanding of the mechanism that distributes  these emissions in the environment
are still incomplete,  both the completeness  and quality of these data and our under-
standing  of  the  relevant  mechanisms  have  progressed  substantially  in  the  last
15 years.  While there  is currently  no Canadian  counterpart  to the  ERS's Indicators,
important efforts have been made to assess the contribution  of agricultural emissions
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to  the  degradation  of ground  and  surface  water quality  A  major  survey  of rural
groundwater quality was conducted in Ontario in 1992. Harker et al.  (1997) reviewed
the available  evidence  on the effects of agricultural  activities on water quality in the
Prairie Provinces and most recently,  Paterson  et al.  (1998)  have reported the findings
of a five year study  of the impact of agriculture  on water quality in the province of
Alberta.
Whether these environmental  issues will become important in a trade context
is difficult to predict. They would only become trade policy issues if they became irri-
tating enough to one of the signatories  to the NAFTA  for that party to  initiate some
trade  sanction  such  as  a  countervailing  duty.  As  mere  mortals,  we  are  not  in  a
position to predict that this will happen. We do however, consider each of these areas
to be potential trade irritants  in the future, and they all represent challenges to  more
effective integration of trade and environmental  policies.
THE ROLES OF INDUSTRY  SELF-REGULATION  AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS
Agricultural  economists  have  generally  focused  on  government  environ-
mental policy  and trade  agreements  as the primary  or even  the exclusive  means  of
resolving harmonization and competitiveness  issues. An emerging trend in business,
however,  suggests  that the  private  sector  is  not  waiting for government  action  to
make  progress  on  these  complex  problems.  Apparently,  too  much  is  at  stake  in
rapidly  expanding global  markets.  A growing number  of private firms  are  under-
taking business-led environmental management programs. Their reasons are diverse,
from cost saving by reducing production waste,  to avoiding regulatory penalties,  to
entering  lucrative  green  markets,  to  ensuring  access  to  global  markets;  and,  their
strategies are often aggressive. Most of the early innovators  have not been food and
fiber  production  firms.  Some  agricultural  input  suppliers  have  extensive  efforts
underway, such as Dupont.
Two  forces  appear  to foster  business-led  environmental  management  (Batie
and Ervin):
*  A desire to lower costs and improve profits while achieving or even
exceeding  environmental  compliance  standards,  i.e.,  compliance-
push forces; and,
*  A desire  to respond  to  consumer  demands  for  more environmen-
tally friendly processes and products,  i.e., demand pull forces.
A recent example of the "compliance-push"  force is the success of the National
Pork  Producers dialogue  on waste  management with  the  U.S.  Environmental  Pro-
tection Agency. The dialogue produced the central strategy for the President's Clean
Water Action Plan to control waste emissions from large confined animal operations.
An example  of the  "demand pull"  forces  is the large growth rate in  "natural"  foods
produced  by  farms with organic  or other  sustainable  agriculture  technologies.  The
potential of demand-pull actions  to solve complex multi-state or cross-border issues,
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such  as  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  hypoxia  problem,  appears  limited.  Still,  the  private
approach  requires  a limited government  role,  such as setting  health standards,  and
grants broad private flexibility.
One  approach  that  many  firms  involved  in  global  commerce  are  eyeing  to
assist their business-led  efforts  is ISO  14000. This  industry initiative  is not designed
to  aid  enforcement  of  environmental  laws  or  inform  the  public.  Rather,  the  firm
undertakes  a series of actions that assure a comprehensive  environmental monitoring
and management system is in place with independent auditing.  Basic elements might
include  waste  disposal  processes,  energy  efficiency,  water  reuse,  and  treatment  of
hazardous  wastes.  Life-cycle  analysis  plays  a  central  role  in  the  ISO  process.  The
International  Standards  Organization  facilitates  the  process  and  assures  that  the
firm's environmental system is  credible. The firm is prohibited from using ISO  14000
status  in marketing  their products.  However,  it may be  a way  of assuring  access  to
certain foreign markets,  if those governments recognize the ISO process. The key role
of transaction  costs surfaces again. ISO  14000 may be particularly attractive to multi-
national  firms  with production and  marketing  operations  in  several  countries with
divergent environmental  systems.
We  can  think  about the  trend  toward  industry  self-regulation  in terms  of a
hypothesis  advanced  by  Coase  (1960).14  If,  according  to  Coase,  government  regu-
lation  can  be  a  transaction  cost  economizing  alternative  to  individual  market
14Coase 11960/1998,  1994)  has  lamented  the  effect  that  his  1960  essay  has  had  on  economics.  His  contention,
recently supported by Farber  (1997),  is that the true message  of his  1960  essay has been lost on economists.  The
exposition of the so-called  "Coase Theorem",  a phrase that originated with Stigler, not with Coase, was not the
aim of the paper. The world without  transaction costs that  is described  in the first five sections  of the  paper is
presented  to  illustrate  a paradox in economic theory.  In such  a world, uncompensated  external  costs, monopo-
lies,  public  good  and free  rider problems would  be  negotiated  away by  those who acted  to exploit the latent
gains from  bilateral or multilateral exchange  that deadweight losses represent.  The paradox is that the economic
theory of 1960, and according to Coase,  the economic theory of 1992, had not integrated transaction costs  into its
conceptual  apparatus.  It  was  therefore  incapable  of  providing  a  coherent  explanation  of  how  problems  of
monopoly,  public goods or externalities could persist. Coase,  in contrast, had already described  the real world as
awash in transaction  costs in  1937. The description of a world without transaction costs as a "Coasian"  world is
a fundamental  error. Coase's claim  is that the world  of economic theory is the world without transaction costs.
If there is a real Coase theorem in the 1960 essay,  it goes something like this. The world in which we live is one
in  which transactions  are costly. Before  we can  transact,  we  need  to  search for  potential  partners  and then  we
need  to  negotiate  terms.  These  activities  consume  resources.  In some  circumstances,  according  to  Coase  "An
alternative  solution is direct governmental  regulation. Instead of instituting a  legal system of rights which can be
modified by transactions on the market, the government  may impose regulations which state what people must
not do and which  have to  be obeyed,"  (Coase,  1960/1988,  p.  117).  This "Coase Theorem",  is  that, under a given
set of institutional  and technological  conditions,  regulation  by the state  may be a transaction  cost economizing
alternative  to  the resolution  of problems through market transactions.  It becomes  an empirical  question,  there-
fore, of under what institutional and technological  circumstances  is this likely to be the case, and how can we tell
if those circumstances  occur.
The  re-emergence  of industry self-regulation,  motivated by the negative  incentives of avoiding potential  lia-
bility  or by the positive incentives of increasing market  share, represents  a test of this Coasian hypothesis.  Have
institutional or technological  conditions changed recently so that government regulation formerly was a transac-
tion  cost  economizing means  of resolving  problems of harmful  interdependence,  but  no  longer  is?  Coase,  in
sections VI  and VIII of his  1960 essay explains that there  is no reason to believe that the actual  pattern of regula-
tion undertaken  by real governments  will necessarily  be a transaction cost economizing  alternative to individual
transactions.  So another  hypothesis is that existing regulations  that are being abandoned  may be cases of actions
that were  not really justified, in the Coasian sense, originally.
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exchanges under specific institutional  or technological  conditions, then the observed
increase  in interest in industry  self-regulation could simply be  a response  to under-
lying changes in institutions or technology.
A  more  accurate  understanding  of  Coase's  hypothesis  also  has  important
implications for the conventional economic analysis of the harmonization of environ-
mental  regulations.  As  Patricia  Lindsey  and  Mary  Bohman  explained  to  this
workshop  last  year,  differences  in  environmental  comparative  advantage,  tech-
nology,  standards  of  living or  preferences  would  provide  a  rationale  for  different
regimes  of  environmental  regulations  in  different  countries.  But  this  analysis  is
incomplete,  in that it  ignores  a potentially  important  category  of transaction  costs.
The  need  to adjust  product specifications  to  different  national  regulatory  require-
ments increases  transaction  costs. Firms  may elect to not sell  into as many markets
under these circumstances, foregoing potential economies of size, scale or scope. Har-
monization  of regulations may be an important means of economizing on transaction
costs.
Our profession has conducted little analysis of the forces driving this apparent
trend and the potential consequences  for environmental  management in agriculture.
Only anecdotal  and case study data are available.  If the privately-led initiatives offer
joint  private  and  public benefits,  then  strategic  public  assistance  may be  used  to
accelerate and expand the process  (Batie and Ervin). We would like to see this group
tackle the empirical work necessary to determine if this is true.
Private  action generally  does not suffice  for solving transboundary  environ-
mental problems. They require  multilateral cooperation,  which involves  huge trans-
action costs. The Montreal Protocol to reduce ozone-depleting substances and the Rio
Conventions  on  climate  change  and  biodiversity  illustrate  such  approaches.
Although there are more than  1000 separate international environmental  agreements
(IEAs), their overall effectiveness has not been assessed. The small number, about 20,
that use trade  measures  appear to be  effective.  Research  suggests  that cooperative
multilateral  action with trade sanctions  fosters  "stronger"  environmental  standards
than unilateral action  (Barrett, 1996).
As evolving  science  reveals  new  linkages  of environmental  systems  across
borders  and  countries  multiply  their connections  through international  commerce,
the impetus for structuring new IEAs will grow. This likely development could give
two side benefits to  lessen trade disputes. First,  the IEAs  will require some  form of
agreement  on  harmonized  standards  for the  issues  at  hand.  Second,  appeal  to a
recognized  international  environmental  agreement  seems  to  be  an  admissible
defense to a NAFTA or GATT challenge.
CONCLUSIONS  AND  RESEARCH  RECOMMENDATIONS
Our digest of the available literature indicates that while there is much that we
still do not know about the complex relationship between trade liberalization in agri-
culture and environmental stewardship,  there is at least a preponderance of evidence
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accumulating  on some  aspects  of this  relationship.  For  example,  there  is  reason to
believe that an environmental  dividend  is at least possible  from the pursuit of trade
liberalization in agriculture. We would hasten to add that the realization  of that divi-
dend  is contingent  on an appropriate  integration  of trade  and agricultural  policies
and  environmental  policies  and  institutions.  And  local  variations  in  ecological,
physical and social circumstances play a critical role in shaping the nature and size of
that potential  dividend.  Unfortunately, available  models and baseline  data are  typi-
cally too aggregative to facilitate  satisfying analysis of the impact of these local varia-
tions  in  conditions.  But  the  costs  of  undertaking  extensively  disaggregated
environmental analysis of the effects  of trade liberalization would be enormous.
In addition,  there seems to be at least some shreds of evidence that compliance
costs associated with environmental regulations are not likely to play a determinative
role  in the  location  of  agricultural  production,  either  at the  primary or  subsequent
processing levels, or in the  patterns  of trade. Of course.  further research in this area
may contradict the admittedly limited evidence compiled so far, but at least from the
perspective  of what we know today,  the risk of the kind  of "race  to the  bottom"  on
environmental  standards  that figured  so  prominently  in the  NAFTA  debate  would
seem to be small in the case of agriculture.
If  the  prognosticators  that have  suggested  environmental  issues  will  figure
prominently  in  the  next  multilateral  round  of  trade  negotiations  in  the  WTO  are
correct,  then our list of potentially  controversial  agriculturally  related resource  and
environmental  issues  anticipates  a difficult way ahead on  the path  to further trade
liberalization.  If the  Article  XX  provisions  of the  GATT  are  retained  or  expanded,
then there will  be much analytical  and empirical work  to be done to aid  in the more
effective targeting of agricultural resource  conservation  programs and on pricing for
water and government land used in agriculture to better reflect the opportunity costs
of those  resources.  This will be much easier to say  than to do. But trade policy ana-
lysts revel in the challenge  of solving problems that have confounded production and
natural resource  economists.
At a more fundamental level, we would like to suggest that more attention  be
devoted to clarification  of some  conceptual  issues. For example,  calls for better  inte-
gration  of  agricultural  trade  and  environmental  policies  are  increasingly  common
place, both by constituents of trade liberalization  and of environmental  stewardship.
But it is not clear what integration means. And, in our judgement,  "policy"  has all too
often been construed  too narrowly.  We would  argue that integration  does not mean
subservience  of one  of these  agendas  to the  other.  And our professional  experience
indicates that there are important  language, ethical  and conceptual  issues that divide
trade  liberalization  advocates  from  their  counterparts  on  the  environmental
stewardship  side.
On the  question of the narrowness  of the concept  of policy,  we would like to
propose that our collective  consciousness  be more aware  of the  role of policy initia-
tives and  institutional changes that arise outside of the realm of interactions among
national  governments.  Subnational  governments  also  have  policy  functions,  as  do
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private voluntary associations.  And legislation is not the only instrument that regu-
lates activities  that have environmental  consequences.  As Elizabeth Brubaker  (1995)
has  shown  so effectively, common  law remedies  against trespass,  nuisance  and  the
violation  of riparian rights played  an important  role  in the regulation  of emissions
from production,  even from agricultural production,  in the United Kingdom, Canada
and the United States until the effectiveness  of those institutions was undermined by
judicial  "innovation"  or by legislative  law. Discussions of the integration  of agricul-
tural trade and resource  conservation  policies  need to better  reflect the complemen-
tarity and the competition  among different levels of policy making.
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Implications, Research
Needs  and  Future Direction
The  objective of the concluding
discussion is to summarize "what
we  have learned", viewed from
the perspective of three countries
and several work environments.